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Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill
Catastrophes: The Need for Strict and
Two-Tier Liability
W. Kip Viscusi
64 Vand. L. Rev. 1717 (2011)
Richard J. Zeckhauser
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill highlighted the glaring
weaknesses in the current liability and regulatory regime for oil
spills and for environmental catastrophes more broadly. This Article
proposes a new liability structure for deep-sea oil drilling and for
catastrophic risks generally. It delineates a two-tier system of
liability. The first tier would impose strict liability up to the firm's
financial resources, including insurance coverage. The second tier
would be an annual tax equal to the expected costs in the coming
year beyond this damages amount. Before beginning a risky
operation, the proposed liability scheme would identify a single
firm-the operator of an oil well-as responsible for generating the
risk. That firm would be expected to contract with other participants
in order to be reimbursed in the event of an accident. The proposed
liability scheme would also require the responsible firm to
demonstrate substantial ability to pay in the first tier before being
permitted to engage in the risky activity. This structure provides for
efficient deterrence for environmental catastrophes since the
responsible party is expecting to bear the risks that it is imposing.
The two-tier system also addresses the challenges posed by the fattailed distributions of catastrophic environmental risks and
provides for more assured and adequate compensation of potential
losses than do current liability and regulatoryarrangements.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF CATASTROPHIC
ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the BP Deepwater Horizon
rig set off the nation's largest coastal oil spill.1 This disaster killed
eleven workers, ultimately dumped an estimated 4.9 million barrels of
oil into the Gulf of Mexico, 2 and imposed financial costs in the tens of
billions of dollars.3 President Obama declared it the worst
environmental disaster in U.S. history. 4 Matters could have been
much worse, both financially and environmentally. Had a mediumsized or even large firm, rather than a giant like BP, generated the
spill, the financial consequences would have been far graver. Resource
damages would have been left unabated, and financial losses would
have been at best partly compensated. BP's unusually deep pockets
made full compensation feasible.
Just like the financial damages, the environmental damage
turned out to be less than feared. The best-estimate projections of
environmental harm were well above the damage that the spill
actually inflicted. 5 Far greater ecological harms were expected,
including severe long-term damage to prime beach areas along the
Gulf Coast. Among the factors that reduced costs below expectations
were the underanticipated capabilities of the oil-eating microbes that
broke down much of the crude oil and the Gulf currents that conveyed

1.
NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT To THE

available at
BP
COMM'N
REPORT],
[hereinafter
at vi-vii
(2011)
PRESDENT,
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documentsDEEPWATER-ReporttothePresi
dentFINAL.pdf.
2.
Id. at 55, 167.
3.
Id. at vi ("The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is
already clear that ... economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.").
4.
Id. at 173 ("Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever
faced." (quoting President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil
Spill (June 15, 2010), (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/re marks-president- nation-bp-oil-spill))).
Id. at 174 ("However widespread (and in many cases severe) the natural resource
5.
damages are, those observed so far have fallen short of some of the worst expectations and
reported conjectures during the early stages of the spill." (citing Leslie Kaufman & Shaila
Dewan, Oiled Gulf May Defy Direst Predictions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, at D1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/14/science/earthVl4spill.html)). Given the fat-tailed property of
losses from many types of catastrophes, a small number of big outliers will account for most of
the losses. This implies that expected losses will exceed actual losses most of the time. See
discussion infra Part II.
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the oil away from areas where it would have caused greater damage. 6
Even though the BP spill was the greatest environmental disaster the
nation has seen, under the current liability and regulatory regime a
future spill could be much more devastating. Further compounding
the harm caused by a new catastrophe is the fact that the responsible
firm is unlikely to have BP's financial resources.
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill exposed glaring safety
failures in both the private and public sectors. All three major
companies involved in the spill had safety shortcomings, which
together almost certainly created the conditions for the massive spill
that resulted.7 The spill also highlighted the deficiencies of the current
regulatory and liability structures for addressing catastrophic risks.
Deepwater drilling provides a timely case study of how to structure
liability for an economic activity that poses a potential catastrophic
loss. Damages that could far exceed the injurer's financial resources
diminish the ability of the tort liability system to create incentives for
safety and to provide compensation. The current liability and
regulatory regime for deepwater drilling should hardly be thought of
as a system; rather, the regime consists of a hodgepodge of liability
structures, damages limits, and ineffective regulatory efforts. In this
Article, we propose that the government jettison this regime and bring
on board a sounder structure. The predominant risk-control
mechanism of our proposed regime is an effective liability system.
Our governmental institutions' inadequate performance
controlling drilling risks received considerable notice. In May 2010,
through Executive Order 13,543, President Obama established the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling ("Commission ' ) to address the spill.8 The
Commission issued multiple reports in 2010 criticizing the Obama

6.
See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 174 (citing Richard Camili et al., Tracking
Hydrocarbon Plume Transport and Biodegradation at Deepwater Horizon, 330 SCIENCE 201,
201-04 (2010); Terry C. Hazen et al., Deep-Sea Oil Plume Enriches Indigenous Oil-Degrading
Bacteria,330 SCIENCE 204, 204-07 (2010); David L. Valentine et al., PropaneRespiration JumpStarts Microbial Response to a Deep Oil Spill, 330 SCIENCE 208, 208-11 (2010); Brian Hamacher,
Wind Keeps Oil From Loop Current & Away From Florida Shores, NBC MIAMI (July 19, 2010,
1:16
PM),
http://www.nbcmiami.com/newsflocal/Wind-Keeps-Oil-From-lnop-Current-AwayFrom-Florida-Shores-98757749.html.
7.
See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 90 ("Better management by BP, Halliburton,
and Transocean would almost certainly have prevented the blowout by improving the ability of
individuals involved to identify the risks they faced, and to properly evaluate, communicate, and
address them.").
8. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397 (May 21, 2010).
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Administration's handling of the spill.9 In January 2011 the
Commission's final report detailed a series of proposed reforms,
including revamping the agencies that regulate deepwater drilling.10
As we wrote this Article, Japan experienced an environmental
disaster of far graver consequence from another energy-related
industry: explosions, partial meltdowns, and radioactive releases at
four of its nuclear plants.1 1 A massive earthquake triggered these
events.12 To be sure, nature played a far more consequential role in
Japan than it did with the BP spill. However, it would be
inappropriate to scrutinize America's greatest environmental disaster
without paying attention to Japan's disaster, which occurred within
the same twelve months. Analysis of that disaster, including the
allocation of responsibility, will have to wait for another day. 13
Nevertheless, we examine these principles in light of the Japanese
experience by identifying similarities and differences and exploring
the implications for creating desirable regulatory and liability
structures. We draw one central lesson from these two disasters and
many others studied: it is extremely difficult to predict the nature or
magnitude of catastrophic events. The losses entailed, even within a
class of disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes, have fat-tailed
distributions, implying potentially huge outlier events, which we will
14
discuss further below.
This analysis seeks neither to lay blame for the past nor to
describe specific actions that would appropriately limit losses in the
future. Rather, it defines a regulatory and liability framework that
will encourage the parties involved in offshore drilling, or any other
economic activity that could produce catastrophic environmental
consequences, to take appropriate actions. Our underlying assumption
is that decisions relating to such activities are highly complex and

9. E.g., John M. Broder, Reports FaultAdministrationon Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010,
at A20, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/1O/O7/science/earth/07spill.html.
10. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at iii, 250-91.
11. Status of the Nuclear Reactors at the FukushimaDaiichi Power Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2011, httpJ/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/03/16/world/asia/reactors-status.html.
12. Id.
13. At the present time, it appears that the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (Tepco) may not be
able to cover the tens of billions of dollars of losses. See Yuka Hayashi, Japan Confronts
Liabilities for
Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
May
4,
2011,
at
A13, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703367004576288692867523776.html.
The
Tepco Chairman, Tsunehisa Katsumata, made the following observation: "No matter how much
money we have, it will not be enough." Id
14. See infra Part III. For fat-tailed distributions of losses, there are a larger number of
very large loss events than one would expect if losses were normally distributed.
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constantly evolving and that the only way to achieve desirable
outcomes is to have parties face appropriate incentives. In a
technologically advanced and advancing society, regulation alone will
not be sufficient because the government will likely direct it at
yesterday's problems. Moreover, liability schemes that might function
well for traditional environmental externalities are not well equipped
to deal with extreme potential outcomes.
Given that few corporations have sufficient resources to cover
the most extreme outcomes, the efficient-control regime must
incorporate not merely regulation and liability, but it must also
include some tax charges for any extreme risks imposed on external
parties that will not be remedied should the company's financial
resources be exhausted. This Article develops a ten-point proposal for
overhauling the current liability and regulatory regime for deepwater
drilling. The principles that we advocate also apply to many other
contexts in which private entities undertake actions that could create
potentially catastrophic environmental risks.
The problem that we address is the following: Should the
government cap firms' liability for damages? Some firms could
potentially generate hazards that inflict damages beyond their
financial resources. The government must deal with these lowprobability, high-loss situations. With a modest damages limit, few
firms will be daunted by the prospect of paying losses but damages
will go unpaid. With unlimited liability to exposure, fewer firms will
enter the field but more damages will be paid after a catastrophe.
Either of these extremes would work poorly. The first would lead firms
to take excessive risks. The second would impose losses exceeding
many firms' financial resources. Thus, firms with few financial
resources to lose would enter and engage in excessively risky behavior.
Our proposal jettisons the current structure of a low damages
cap coupled with ineffective regulation. 15 It replaces that system with
a greatly expanded level of liability coupled with a tax to provide
incentives for risks beyond the liability limit, which we call a two-tier
liability system. This system creates strong financial incentives for
safety. If welcomed by the risk-control community, this structure can
provide the framework not only for addressing deepwater-drilling
risks, but also for other catastrophic risks. With modest modifications,

15. The Oil Pollution
have not committed gross
Given the BP experience,
binding for major oil spills.

Act ("OPA") has a nominal damages cap of $75 million for firms that
negligence or willful misconduct. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006).
however, firms in the future might not expect that this cap will be
See discussion infra Parts V-VI.
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the government could employ our proposal to address a broad range of
catastrophic environmental risks.
Our proposal starts by recognizing that the potential for
catastrophic accidents generally, and the BP accident specifically,
represents a challenge of effectively controlling risks that impose
extreme damages on others. Controlling risks is always difficult
because of asymmetric information; the need for regulation and
litigation to be effectively aligned; the dual needs of deterrence and
efficient compensation; a range of additional analytic issues; and, of
course, politics. This analysis addresses the cluster of considerations
that must enter any risk-control regime while paying particular
attention to extreme risks. It leaves politics aside because we think
that a well-structured regime, when chosen far in advance of the next
accident, has a reasonable chance to win political approval. By
contrast, once an accident happens, strong interests become
established, and there is little reasoned discourse or clear thinking in
the political arena. Because accidents are low probability events, it is
difficult to identify either victims or responsible parties in advance.
The BP spill is an outlier among environmental accidents for
three reasons. First, its mere magnitude as the largest coastal spill in
U.S. history, both in terms of the quantity of oil and the number of
people affected, makes it stand out. Second, multiple parties-three
important ones-helped contribute to the situation producing the
catastrophe. That is often the case, but many models of risk
deterrence assume only one responsible party, or at least one
predominantly responsible party. Third, the magnitude of the
damages assessed would bankrupt almost all companies. Fortunately,
that was not true in the case of BP, which will pay all or virtually all
of the damages independent of culpability.
Our proposal incorporates two basic principles. First, the
overall goal of a risk-control structure should be to minimize the sum
of two costs: the costs of losses plus the costs of avoiding losses.
Second, no structure for controlling catastrophic losses can effectively
meet the cluster of goals that all would agree are desirable for such a
scheme. The components of our reform proposal, also summarized in
Table 1, are as follows:
Identifiable responsible party. The oil company that owns the
lease and undertakes the drilling is fully responsible for all financial
harms directly associated with the spill.16 This ensures that there is
16. For concreteness, our analysis refers to the "oil company" as the company owning the
lease and operating the well. We realize that there may be other institutional arrangements.
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one party overseeing the whole process, a party who coordinates and
monitors the actions of those beneath it. There is no separate liability
for other firms involved in the drilling.1 7 Thus, for example, there is no
joint and several liability under this system. The oil company can
establish whatever contractual arrangements it wishes with other
firms involved in the drilling operations, and the oil company in turn
can recoup costs due to negligence or other specified behavior of its
corporate partners based on whatever contractual arrangements it
makes with them.
Strict Liability. The responsible party is strictly liable for all
losses due to the spill. There is consequently no need to ascertain the
appropriate level of care and whether the drilling operations met that
level of care. Nor is there a need to evaluate the behavior of other
partners in the drilling effort. The only informational requirement for
implementing our liability proposal is to determine the amount of
damages.
Tax on noncompensable risk imposed. No corporation has
sufficient resources to cover the most extreme potential losses from an
accident. In the case of a megacatastrophe, the government will pay
significant amounts and/or losses will go uncompensated. The
operator is essentially judgment proof for extreme accidents. Absent
other arrangements, operators will therefore take excessive risks. To
correct this propensity, the operator should pay a tax for the expected
external losses imposed beyond the amount that it will be able to pay.
Having this arrangement in place will allow operators to drill even if
they do not have the resources to cover losses in excess of the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill. This tax establishes what we term a tieredliability system when imposed in conjunction with liability for
damages up to the cap specified in the demonstration of financial
capacity.
Demonstration of financial capacity. The government should
restrict deepwater oil drilling to firms that can demonstrate a
combination of adequate financial resources, expected compensation
17.

The Japanese nuclear disaster liability system provides an interesting contrast with the

U.S. liability system. In the Japanese system, the plant operator bears almost all liability. See
[Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage], Law No. 147 of 1961, pt. 1I, ch. 1, § 3 (Japan),
translated in Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (Apr. 17,
2009), http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/legislationljapan-docs/Japan-Nuclear-Damage-Compensation
-Act.pdf. Thus, for example, General Electric, which manufactured the Mark I reactor, which has
encountered a range of safety issues, will most likely not bear significant financial responsibility.
See Andrew Longstreth, GE Unlikely to Face Liability in JapaneseNuclear Crisis, REUTERS, Apr.
1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04101/us-japan-ge-liabiity
-idUSTRE7302EB20110401.
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from other participants, and insurance to cover the cost of catastrophic
spills of the magnitude of the BP Deepwater Horizon spill. The
responsible party will be strictly liable for all damages up to its
financial capacity. Although the financial capacity requirement will
vary depending on the risky activity's potential for harm, an
appropriate amount for deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico might
be $20 billion, which is the size of the fund that BP created at
President Obama's urging after the spill. 18
Damages. There are three components to our damages
proposal. First, it will completely eliminate any cap on damages. (The
statutory cap set by the Oil Pollution Act is currently a paltry $75
million.) 19 Second, it will eliminate all punitive damages for oil spills.
Third, it will compensate only direct losses. The elimination of the
damages cap coupled with our tiered-liability system will establish
efficient incentives for safety. Because catastrophic oil spills can be
readily monitored by the government, the courts, and the public,
additional punitive damages are not needed to establish the efficient
level of care. Payments for financial and property damage losses are
limited to losses the spill caused directly. More distant economic
ramifications of these losses are not compensable.
Natural resource damages and restoration. For natural
resource damages, the primary emphasis should be on restoration.
Restoration should continue until the natural resource benefits of
additional restoration no longer exceed their costs.
Recipient of net resource value losses. For any shortfall of the
restoration from complete restoration, the oil company must pay the
government for the natural resource damages it incurs. Such damages
would also include losses for the period before a resource is restored.
The government may choose to use these funds for further restoration
at the site, for restoration elsewhere, for other environmental efforts,
or for other purposes.
Regulatory complement. Liability should be coupled with a
regulatory regime where the regulation of drilling activities is based
on a comparison of the benefits and costs of these efforts, with the goal
to maximize net benefits. Full adherence to regulatory standards
would not protect a firm against damages from accidents.
Focused, net economic benefits. In assessing the benefits of
deepwater oil drilling, there should be no additional premium
accorded to the economic benefits associated with national security or
18.
19.

BP COMM'N REPORT, supranote 1, at 185.
33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006).
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employment effects beyond the assessed benefits for other less risky
drilling activities or other sources of energy. Any crediting of oil
exploration of any kind with broader economic benefits to the economy
must be done on a net benefit basis that also incorporates recognition
of the environmental harms associated with the production and
consumption of petroleum products, including the effect on global
climate change.
Moratorium on all new deepwater drilling. Until Congress
adopts these proposals, the government should impose a moratorium
on all new deepwater-drilling activities. Firms that accept strict
liability, demonstrate adequate financial resources to pay for the costs
of a major disaster, pay the tax for the expected damages beyond its
financial capacity, and subject proposed drilling operations to a safety
review should be exempted from the moratorium.
Although we tailored the proposals to oil drilling, they can be
readily adapted to other contexts. Spills from oil tankers, such as the
Exxon Valdez, represent an obvious extension. The hazards of nuclear
reactors also represent an analogous situation of a low
probability/catastrophic loss activity. Clearly, we would not extend our
proposal to require that all economic activity have the tiered liability
structure. But we would extend our proposal to situations in which the
prospect of catastrophic losses is sufficiently prominent that
legislative damages caps have been enacted. Oil drilling, oil transport,
and nuclear power are among the most prominent economic activities
that meet this test.

II. EFFICIENT SAFETY LEVELS
Before considering the performance of (and possible changes in)
the role of liability and regulation with respect to potentially
catastrophic environmental risks, it is useful to specify the objectives
we seek to promote and the criteria by which we will judge policies.
Our approach assumes that the proper role of liability and regulation
is to produce efficient risk outcomes in terms of establishing an
appropriate balance between the benefits and costs of promoting
safety.
Our working assumption is that the level of safety should be
set at an economically efficient level. This assumption has two
principal consequences for the design of social policies addressing
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environmental risks. 20 First, the government should structure policies
to maximize the net benefits to society. This is equivalent to
maximizing the difference between the benefits and costs. Second, the
implication of this objective is that the government should increase
the level of safety until the incremental benefits from boosting the
level of safety equal the incremental costs. In the usual situation, the
cost of providing safety rises at an increasing rate as the level of safety
increases, while the benefits of providing higher levels of safety
diminish as the safety level rises.
While implementing these guidelines for catastrophic
environmental risks poses considerable challenges, 21 formulating the
policy objective in this manner clarifies many fundamental policy
issues. At the most basic level, the optimal level of safety will seldom
involve zero risk. Deepwater oil exploration is an inherently risky
enterprise that in the case of the BP Deepwater Horizon involved
drilling thirteen thousand feet below the sea floor in more than five
thousand feet of Gulf water to produce a well that went down three
and a half miles. 22 The mere magnitudes involved imply significant
risk, but beyond that, all work at the frontiers of technology involves
techniques, systems, and equipment that have not been tested in the
field, imposing new risks that are little understood. Because
incremental costs tend to escalate rapidly as the level of the risk
approaches zero, it will usually be efficient from an economic
standpoint for there to be some chance of adverse events, including
potentially catastrophic environmental disasters. 23 Even for risks
posing potentially catastrophic losses, it is generally neither feasible
nor desirable to completely eliminate these hazards. The task for
regulatory and liability policies is to ensure that the prevailing level of
risk is set at the efficient level and that, if an adverse event does
occur, the remediation and compensation is appropriate. The fact that
deepwater drilling poses potentially serious environmental risks and
has already produced a catastrophic loss is not a sufficient reason to
20. For a review of these principles, see W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, JR., EcONOMIcs OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 30-33 (4th ed. 2005).
21. See infra Part VI.
22. See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at vii-ix.
23. If the costs avoided are great, then it is perfectly rational to accept a small but positive
risk of even a megacatastrophe. By analogy, we often risk our lives and those of family
members-which is as bad an outcome as we can imagine for ourselves-by driving to a
recreational event. No loss carries a weight of minus infinity. See Lawrence Summers & Richard
Zeckhauser, Policymaking for Posterity, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 115, 123--25 (2008)
(observing that even the most severe potential loss from climate change-which could entail the
end of human civilization-should not get an implied infinite weight).
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ban the activity; just as the Japanese nuclear plant catastrophe does
not mean that the world should abandon nuclear power. Rather, these
accidents demonstrate that we should have better systems to ensure
appropriate safety with both technologies.
Oil spills impose severe external financial and environmental
harms that a profit-maximizing firm will not take into full account
absent liability and/or government sanctions. Left unfettered,
enterprise decisions will be neither socially desirable nor economically
efficient. 24 Catastrophic environmental risks add an additional
dimension to the traditional externalities problem-the potential that
even with existing systems of liability a firm may be judgment proof
for a significant portion of losses, and hence reckless. We target our
policy proposals at achieving the appropriate balance between safety
level and safety expenditure even when catastrophic losses are
possible.
Formulating the efficiency objective highlights what factors are
and are not pertinent for setting safety levels. An oft-heard argument
that has played a prominent role in the deepwater-drilling debate is
that the country needs to continue deepwater drilling and other risky
oil industry activities to meet our national goal of achieving energy
independence. 25 President Nixon, under the "Project Independence"
campaign, employed energy independence as a mantra to justify
significant increases in offshore-oil exploration, including additional
leases off the Gulf Coast. 26 Energy independence is an effective battle
cry, used by both "drill baby drill" proponents and fierce energy
conservationists, but it is an unattainable goal in the foreseeable
future.
"Independence" concerns are at best tangentially relevant to
regulating the level of safety for deepwater drilling for several
reasons. First, the world oil price and subsequent refinery and
distribution costs drive the price of petroleum products in the United
States and other countries. U.S. production of oil represents a very
small share of the world output and is barely a dominant share of U.S.

24. Victims of these externalities potentially could bargain with the firm to control the
externality to efficient levels, but with a large number of affected parties such Coasean bargains
are not feasible. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 83-88
(2004).
25. See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 56.
26. See id. at 31.
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consumption. 27 Except in situations involving cutoffs to the U.S. oil
supply, such as oil embargoes and crises in other major oil producing
countries, whether the oil is domestic or foreign matters little.
Furthermore, the United States derives national security benefits
from all U.S. oil production, not just risky drilling. An appropriate
policy mechanism for reflecting concerns with maintaining domestic
production for security reasons would be to provide tax subsidies for
all domestic oil production, where those subsidies recognize the overall
economic desirability of all U.S. oil production and do not place a
differential premium on the forms of oil drilling that pose potentially
catastrophic environmental risks. We propose that any credit for
favorable national security effects should apply to all oil drilling, with
no special premium accorded those in deep water. Thus, even allowing
for national security concerns, there is no valid reason for relaxing the
safety standards for offshore drilling. We also note that most major
energy-producing technologies, for example nuclear power as the
Fukushima incident makes evident, pose the risk of catastrophic
environmental consequences. Policy assessments should treat all
energy-producing technologies the same in terms of credit for
associated benefits, such as national security, and associated harms,
such as global warming effects.
A parallel argument applies for not considering the
employment effects of deepwater drilling as an economic benefit. All
economic activity generates associated employment effects, and there
is no reason to subsidize either oil production generally or deepwater
drilling specifically in order to create employment. We do not count
secondary economic losses in our proposal because secondary economic
benefits also accrue after a spill when compensation is paid or when
the government spends money, as would happen with our proposal.
Society should not compromise appropriate levels of safety in order to
foster higher levels of employment. Nevertheless, a danger of
excessively stringent regulations and liability rules is that they will
discourage economically efficient industries and activities. That would
have undesirable labor market effects. Employment consequences
matter, and they should be recognized as a potential source of costs of
excessively stringent policies, but they do not provide an independent
basis for justifying situations that put the environment at excess risk.

27. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW AUGUST 2011, at 40 fig.3.3a
(2011), available at http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/sec3_6.pdf (noting that
petroleum imports made up forty-seven percent of U.S. demand in the first half of 2011).
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Our proposed policy principles also specify that any tally of the
broader economic ramifications of oil exploration must recognize the
net consequences of petroleum products, including their negative
effects. Chief among these is environmental pollution, including global
climate change. Policies should be based on a comprehensive approach
to assessing the desirability of oil exploration that considers all
consequences and bases policy on the difference between positive and
negative effects. The prime negatives-the conventional pollutants
associated with petroleum products and their climate-change impactare substantial. 28 Only a net tally, which also takes account of taxes at
end use, could tell us whether the nation should subsidize oil
exploration, as it presently does with generous depletion allowances.
Though conceptually simple, it is difficult in practice to
establish the appropriate balance between safety costs and net
benefits. The most significant difficulty is assessing both the expected
environmental costs of deepwater drilling and how more stringent
control will reduce these costs. The expected cost is defined as the
product of the probability of an adverse outcome and the size of the
loss. The calculation for multiple possible events consists of the sum of
these expected costs for all types of possible adverse outcomes.
There are substantial gaps in our knowledge pertaining to both
the probabilities and the potential harms associated with major oil
spills, the two components of the calculation. Very frequently
occurring risks that pose moderate or minor harms create little
difficulty for assessing the likelihoods or magnitudes of losses. These
events occur quite often, so it is straightforward to learn both their
likelihood and magnitude. Moreover, because the events are frequent
and the stakes are modest, taking a period to learn about the actual
level of the risks and the value of damages is not too costly.
Consequently, it is usually both feasible and desirable to become
informed about such hazards. Situations in which the probabilities
and the consequences are well known are situations of risk.
Matters become quite different once we venture into the lowprobability, high-loss world of catastrophic risks. Because the
probabilities are very small, there are few opportunities to learn about
the magnitude of the risk. Thus, we may be aware of the presence of
hazards but have only a poor idea of the size of the probabilities that
28. For a discussion of conventional pollutants that are linked to petroleum products, see
W. Kip Viscusi et al., Environmentally Responsible Energy Pricing, 15 ENERGY J. 23, 28-42. For
linkage to global climate change, see Ralph E.H. Sims et al., Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, Energy Supply, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION 251, 305 (B. Metz et al.
eds., 2007).
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are involved, making this a situation of uncertainty-one where
probabilities are not known-rather than a situation of risk.
Probability assessments become even more complicated when trying to
ascertain the incremental effect of safety measures, as there may be
even less knowledge of how these small probabilities will change as
different safety precautions are taken. Similarly, the magnitude of the
losses-the other component of the loss calculation-may be highly
unpredictable even after an oil spill occurs. Even a year after the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill, there remains substantial disagreement
about what the ultimate harm will be.
Indeed, matters may be more difficult: some types of hazards
may not be identifiable in advance. When the states of the world (as
decision theorists call them) are unknown, we are in a world of
"ignorance" rather than one of mere uncertainty. 29 As one Shell
geophysicist commented, "[Y]ou just don't know what you don't
30
know."
One approach for dealing with dimly understood or, worse,
hard-to-imagine risks is to take advantage of information that
develops as these disasters need not be a complete surprise. The BP
Deepwater Horizon well had developed unexpected pressure anomalies
that cast doubt on the integrity of the cement casing for the well, but
this information was not fully exploited. 31 Establishing greater
corporate responsibility for liability will provide incentives for the oildrilling company to develop and use such ongoing informational
inputs in making its safety decisions. The government should take
measures to collect and facilitate sharing of such information among
companies.
III. BEHAVIORAL DECISIONS, FAT TAILS, AND THE SEPARATION OF
PROBABILITY AND SIZE OF LOSS
Our discussion and most analyses of losses due to
environmental catastrophes assume a rational approach to policy
decisions. Yet a broad strand of research developed over the past three
decades in the field of behavioral decisionmaking demonstrates that
individuals have great difficulty assessing and evaluating lowprobability, high-loss events. They fall prey to errors both systematic
29. Richard Zeckhauser introduces this concept in the context of the climate debate. See
Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Strategy of Choice, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE 16-17 (Richard J.
Zeckhauser ed., 1991).
30. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
31. See id. at 98, 105-09.
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and severe, as we illustrate below. Though the study of institutions,
such as government agencies and corporations, and their ability to
deal with such situations is less well developed, there is little evidence
32
that their decisions come any closer to optimality.
To illustrate, consider the availability heuristic. 33 It tells us
that decisionmakers judge the likelihood of an event by how easily
they can bring an instance to mind. Thus, in light of the recent
Japanese nuclear power disaster, it seems clear that both citizens and
governments will think the probability of a nuclear meltdown is much
higher than they would have a few months earlier. Yet an earthquake
of the magnitude of the Japanese quake is exceedingly unusual. The
Japanese quake ranks as one of the largest earthquakes ever
recorded. 34 Indeed, mere event similarity may be sufficient to
dramatically influence policy decisions. The Three Mile Island
incident in the United States effectively shut down nuclear power
construction for decades, even though the esteemed Kemeny
Commission estimated that less than one life was lost from the
radiation released. 35 But citizens, legislators, and even regulators
assumed that a major life-loss incident from a to-be-built nuclear
power plant was much more likely than it would have been.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision under Risk is a seminal article in the behavioral
decision field. 36 Kahneman and Tversky note that individuals make
decisions reflecting severe biases relative to prescriptive decision
analysis both in valuing outcomes and in weighing probabilities. 37 In
valuing outcomes, they hypothesized
that individuals are
appropriately risk-averse in achieving gains, but contrary to rational

32. W. KIP Viscusi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY 2 (1998).
33. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 207 (1973) (discussing how the
availability heuristic leads to the "phenomenon of illusory correlation").
34. See, e.g., Largest Earthquakes in the World Since 1900, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.,
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/1Olargest-world.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2011)
(ranking the Japanese quake as the fourth largest earthquake since 1990, behind earthquakes in
Chile, the United States, and Indonesia).
35.

See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND, THE NEED FOR

CHANGE: THE LEGACY OF TMI 12 (1979) [hereinafter TMI REPORT] ("IT]he radiation doses were
so low that we conclude that the overall health effects will be minimal.... [A] projection derived
for the total number of radiation-induced cancers among the population affected by the accident
at TMI was 0.7.').
36. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
37. Id. at 263.
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prescription, are risk-preferring in the loss domain. 38 Thus, for
instance, they would rather take a fifty percent chance of losing four
hundred dollars than lose two hundred dollars for sure. The
implications for catastrophic environmental losses are profound. For
example, we may do too little to control them relative to other risks
that have lesser-expected consequences but greater probabilities of
39
occurrence.
Prescriptive decision analysis tells us that probabilities should
be weighted linearly; a ten percent chance of a loss is twice as
consequential as a five percent chance. Prospect Theory and empirical
studies documenting its predicted patterns of risk beliefs show that,
for actual decisions, individuals are quite unresponsive to differences
in probabilities. Thus, a ten percent probability may count only 1.2
times as much as a five percent probability. 40 And when the
probabilities are much smaller-as with catastrophic environmental
risks-individuals may hardly notice even a ten-fold reduction in risk,
although this brings about a ten-fold reduction in expected
consequences. Untrained decision processes will both overestimate
small risks and undervalue significant reductions in low-probability,
high-loss risks.
Prescriptive decision analysis separates out the consideration
of consequences and probabilities, the two different essential
components of outcomes. There are strong supporting normative
principles for treating them independently. 41 Hence, we recommend
separation between the two for policymakers and analysts who are
attempting to assess catastrophic environmental risks. Instead of
making distinctions, they should consider that for catastrophic
outcomes "a risk is a risk is a risk." Fallacious reasoning came to the
fore in discussing Japan's nuclear calamity, where many television
analysts, and presumably their advisors, lumped the Japan disaster in
with Three Mile Island (no documented health losses) and Chernobyl

38. Id.
39. Political processes reinforce this bias since politicians are strongly oriented toward "not
on my watch" behavior. This implies that high-probability disasters count much more than lowprobability disasters that impose much greater expected losses.
40. This result is true more generally when people lack full information and act as rational
decisionmakers. See W. Kip Viscusi, Sources of Inconsistency in Societal Responses to Health
Risks, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 257 (1990) (discussing "how the character of individual risk
perceptions can generate inconsistent patterns of response").
41.

See generally HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON

CHOICES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 297 (1968) (indicating "how a decisionmaker's preferences for
consequences, attitudes towards risk, and judgments about uncertain events" can be better
incorporated into formal analysis to reduce decisionmaker biases).
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(extreme health losses). 42 The former is trivially small relative to the
Japan situation, while the latter is many times worse.
Proper assessment of the magnitude of losses from a
catastrophe reveals the disturbing reality that losses from disasters
tend to have fat-tailed distributions (i.e., distributions where there is a
nontrivial chance of extremely large losses). Such distributions look
nothing like the normal distributions that are familiar, such as that
used to characterize the distribution of human heights, and that play
a central role in most empirical investigations in the social sciences.
Even lognormal distributions, which pay greater attention to extreme
outcomes, do not come close to having the fat tails found in the
distributions of losses from catastrophes. Disaster losses-such as
those from earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods-are much better
described by a power law distribution. With a power law distribution,
the greatest loss may easily be three times or even ten times as great
as the second greatest loss, whereas no such variation is observed with
respect to normally distributed variables such as individual height.
Figure 1 uses the power law scales to illustrate the distribution
of fatalities from U.S. hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, and
earthquakes. 43 The vertical axis is the cumulative number of each type
of event per year, while the horizontal axis is the number of fatalities
per event. Note that both scales have a progression in terms of orders
of magnitude. For example, on the vertical axis one hundred is twice
as high as ten, even though one hundred is an order of magnitudeten times-greater than ten. The data indicate roughly linear
relationships over two to three orders of magnitude-that is, factors of
44
one hundred to one thousand-in the number of fatalities.
The following examples illustrate the wide variability that may
occur in the upper tail of the loss distribution. One of the most severe
U.S. wildfire losses in terms of acres burned was the Yellowstone fire

42. See, e.g., Jenny Marder, Japan'sNuclear Crisis:Does it Compare to Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl?, PBS NEWSHOUR, Mar. 14, 2011, httpJ/www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2011/03/
cooling-system-fails- at-nuclear-reactors-fuel-talk-of-past-disasters.html (contrasting the causes
and outcomes of the pending Fukushima meltdown to those of Chernobyl and Three Mile Island).
Compare TMI REPORT, supra note 35, at 12 (discussing the minimal health losses at Three Mile
Island), with CHERNOBYL FORUM, CHERNOBYL'S LEGACY: HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS & RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELARUS, THE RusSIAN

FEDERATION & UKRAINE 7-8 (2d ed. 2005), available at http:llwww.iaea.org/Publications/
Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf.
43. A variable p(x) has a power law distribution if it can be characterized as p(x) = cxd,
where c and d are constants, so that logp(x) = log c + d log x.
Economic and Life Losses, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
44. Fact Sheet: Natural Disasters-Forecasting
SURV., http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/natural-disasters/index.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
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in 1988, which consumed about 1.6 million acres. 45 Before that, the
most recent wildfire that burned more than one million acres
happened ninety years ago: the 1918 Cloquet-Moose Lake fire in
Minnesota that burned 1.2 million acres. 46 The deadliest earthquake
since 1900 was the 1976 Tangshan, China earthquake, which officially
killed 255,000, although many estimate the death toll to be actually as
high as 655,000. 47 The 2004 Sumatra earthquake ranks second with a
death toll of 227,898.48 When human action is a critical trigger, recordsetting losses also can differ dramatically. The largest North
American oil spill was the 1910 Lakeview Gusher spill in California,
which poured out 9 million barrels of oil. 49 The 2010 BP Deepwater
Horizon spill ranks second, with 4.9 million barrels. 50 The 1979 Ixtoc
well off the coast of Mexico spilled 3.3 million barrels. 51 Terrorist
events display similar variability. Prior to 9/11, the greatest loss in
the United States was the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, when 168
53
people died. 52 The 9/11 attacks killed nearly 3,000 people.
There are two implications of catastrophes being characterized
by fat-tailed distributions. First, where disasters are concerned, the
past may not be prologue. A future disaster could easily be many
times worse. Second, a single extreme outcome may readily account
for most of the losses from a particular type of catastrophe. This
second implication influences our policy recommendation. It would be
infeasible to restrict drilling to companies that could cover any
conceivable cost; possibly no company qualifies. But to proceed with
our everyday activities, we must let processes that impose risks go
45. See Historically Significant Wildland Fires, NAT'L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., httpj/www.
nifc.gov/firelnfo/fireInfo-stats-histSigFires.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2011) (listing several of
the largest wildland fires in U.S. history). For a sense of the variation in monetary losses, see
Deadliest/Large-Loss Fires: The 10 Largest Loss Wildland Fres in the U.S., NAT'L FIRE PROT.
ASS'N, http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=954&itemlD=44745&
URL=ResearchFire%20statistics/Deadliest/large-loss%20fires (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
46.

NAT'L INTERAGENCY FIRE CTR., supra note 45.

47. Earthquakes with 50,000 or More Deaths, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., httpJ/earthquake
.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/most_destructive.php (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
48. Id.
49. See World's Largest Oil Spills Map, GEOLOGY, http://geology.com/articles/largest-oilspills-map/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2011). These measures are in terms of barrels of oil. Should the
loss be converted to dollars, we would expect even more variability.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Oklahoma City Bombing, 1995, FEMA, http://www.fema.gov/emergency/usr/usrok95.
shtm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
53. 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, httpJ/topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopicssubjects
/s/septll_2001/attacks/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (listing the number of dead as
2,992).

20111

STRICT AND TWO-TIER LIABILITY

1735

forward. Thus, when they do, we should charge the operators for the
expected risks they impose beyond the maximum amount that we
require or could possibly expect them to pay.
The failure to prepare for such unprecedented risks manifested
when the forty-seven-foot-high tsunami struck Fukushima in March
2011.
In 2002, following new, nonbinding guidelines by a government
advisory group, Tokyo Electric Power Co., Japan's biggest utility,
raised its maximum projected tsunami at Fukushima Daiichi to
between 17.7 and 18.7 feet--considerably higher than the 13-foot-high
bluff. Yet the company appeared to respond only by raising the level of
an electric pump near the coast by eight inches, presumably to protect
it from high water, regulators said.
"We can only work on precedent, and there was no precedent,"
said Tsuneo Futami, a former Tokyo Electric nuclear engineer who
was the director of Fukushima Daiichi in the late 1990s. "When I
54
headed the plant, the thought of a tsunami never crossed my mind."
IV. INSURANCE PRINCIPLES, COMPENSATION, AND NONTRANSFERABLE

LOSSES
Beyond generating an efficient level of safety, a central policy
objective is to provide appropriate levels of compensation for
environmental harms. There are many potential rationales for
compensating injuries caused by environmental disasters. The most
important rationale arises when the victims have property rights to
the resources that have been lost. In that instance, it is widely viewed
as fair and equitable to compensate them. But quite apart from
restoring equity, payment of compensation usually performs two
additional functions: deterring excess risks through a liability system
and providing efficient insurance.
The insurance function of compensation seeks to provide
efficient risk spreading for those who have lost value. The standard
rationale for the insurance function of liability is that addressing
financial losses is desirable because most people tend to be riskaverse. Liability payments that restore people to their prespill level of
financial well-being are generally desirable. The "make whole"
principle for setting damages for financial loss, apart from its equity

54. Norimitsu Onishi & James Glanz, Old &ience on Tsunami Risk Guided by Japan's
Nuclear Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2011, at Al.

1736

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:6:1717

accomplishments, simultaneously insures such losses to an optimal
level.
However, this insurance analogy and the desirability of making
people whole does not carry over to nontransferable goods, such as
environmental quality or severe adverse health effects-both frequent
consequences of environmental catastrophes. People will surely regret
suffering environmental damage, and payment of money could
improve their well-being, and perhaps even get them back to their
original level of welfare. But even if there were no liability or
compensation system, no one would expect people to purchase
insurance that would provide a monetary payment if the environment
is harmed since money and environmental resources are not easily
substitutable goods.
The inability of money to substitute for nontransferable losses
involving fatalities.
particularly evident for situations
is
Compensation levels in wrongful-death cases do not involve payment
levels sufficient to restore the person's well-being to the same level as
when alive. For starters, after a person's death the deceased cannot
reap any direct welfare benefits from such payments so that even
posing the question in terms of making the victim whole is either an
irrelevant abstraction or a logical impossibility. Similarly, anticipation
of such a bequest before death will rarely make a person indifferent to
a fatal injury.
The widespread lack of substitutability between money and
55
health has been documented empirically for job-related injuries.
Serious injuries often impede a person's ability to increase individual
welfare through financial expenditures. Because serious injuries
reduce the degree to which money enhances well-being, people would
the amount
generally choose insurance coverage that falls far short 5of
6
needed to restore them to the pre-injury level of welfare.
Similarly, if environmental harms are not readily reversed
through monetary expenditure, there will be no compelling rationale
for insurance. The same argument applies to environmental injuries
that do not hurt humans directly. Millions of Americans may feel that
55. W. Kip Viscusi & Williams N. Evans, Utility Functions that Depend on Health Status:
Estimates and Economic Implications, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 353, 354 (1990).
56. More technically, if actuarially fair insurance is available, a rational individual will
purchase sufficient insurance so that his marginal utility of income is constant across states. if
back pain does not affect the marginal utility of income, then one would not insure at all against
an injury causing such pain. Indeed, if back pain prevented one from engaging in an expensive
recreation, say skiing, then suffering pain would reduce the marginal utility of income. A
rational person would anti-insure, paying in the bad state (back pain) to have more money in the
good state (unimpaired).
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they are injured because sea turtles will no longer frequent certain
areas of the Gulf of Mexico, but these are not the types of losses that
can be replaced by paying people for the loss.
Consequently, in the case of environmental harms from oil
spills, the emphasis should be on ameliorating the environmental
harm to an efficient level rather than compensating the public for the
lessened value of the environmental amenity that they experience.
The emphasis of current policies on restoration of environmental
57
losses rather than direct payments to the citizenry is well founded.
To the extent that there is a deterrence rationale for additional
sanctions, such funds should be paid to the U.S. Treasury rather than
to any particular parties who experience a loss.
V. THE CURRENT LIABILITY STRUCTURE: RETROSPECTIVE LIABILITY

Two different law and economics approaches can generate
efficient liability regimes from the standpoint of deterrence-payment
of the full damages for the harm after the harm has occurred and
payment ex ante of an amount equal to the expected loss, which could
be thought of as paying the expected value of the externality one is
imposing. 58 Ex ante payments are more than hypothetical policy
designs. Carbon taxes could be viewed as a way of charging firms for
pollution costs ex ante, and regulatory sanctions for violations in
situations in which no harm has occurred likewise can similarly serve
a prospective deterrence role. Our tiered liability proposal will
incorporate a prospective liability component of tax changes for
externalities beyond the damages amount that the company can pay.
Standard analyses of the deterrence equivalence of the retrospective
and prospective liability approaches generally deal with the simple
financial loss case, which is a useful starting point for conceptualizing
59
the issues.
Under the conventional retrospective liability approach,
payment for all damages leads the injurer to internalize costs and to
57. Determining what level of recovery achieves restoration is not always straightforward
because the resources being restored may have been evolving even in the absence of the spill. See
BP COMM'N REPORT, s upra note 1, at 212.
58. John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Incentive-based Decentralization: ExpectedExternality Payment Induced Efficient Behavior in Groups, in ARROW AND THE ASCENT OF
MODERN EcoNoMI THEORY 439, 445 (George R Feiwel ed., 1987).
59. In addition, if the expected loss amounts are equal to the amount of damages, then this
formulation also imposes at least an implicit assumption of risk neutrality. If the harm leads to
large losses to particular individuals who are risk-averse, then the appropriate measure of losses
is the certainty equivalent of the harm.

1738

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:6:1717

take appropriate levels of care. This liability system, which follows the
usual tort law approach, also generates damages payments that can
60
be used for purposes of compensation, thus serving a dual function.
For this approach to be workable, two principal requirements must be
met. First, it must be possible to determine the magnitude of the
harm. Rarely is this task straightforward for catastrophic losses. For
example, there is still no approximate price tag available for the
financial and environmental damage caused by the BP Deepwater
Horizon spill. Second, the injurer must be able to pay the damages. If
the defendant has insufficient resources, then the full damages that
might be paid will be effectively capped, and deterrence incentives will
be insufficient. For that reason, we propose that firms engaged in
deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico should have to demonstrate
that they have the financial resources to pay for damages equal to the
fund created by BP to pay for the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, that
amount being $20 billion. Regulators could require a different
demonstrated financial capacity amount depending on the nature and
location of a well. What is critical is that the amount be substantial
relative to potential damages.
Given the fat tails associated with the distribution of losses
from catastrophes, it is frequently impossible or undesirable to limit
risky activities solely to firms that can pay any conceivable level of
damages. Hence, we recommend below a two-tier liability system for
such activities. At the first tier, the responsible party would have to
show a significant ability to pay for the likely range of losses through
its assets and insurance should there be an accident. For other risky
endeavors, a guideline might be the highest previous damages amount
for such activities or a calculated estimate of only one chance in one
hundred to be exceeded in the next decade.
Estimates of the fat-tailed, loss-distribution function for an
activity can provide guidance in conjunction with the annual payment
the firm would pay to a federal fund to cover expected losses beyond
its financial capacity amount. For example, if government regulators
thought that a deepwater well in the Gulf had an annual one in one
thousand chance of imposing losses beyond $20 billion, and if the
expected magnitude of total losses in such a case were $50 billion,
then the well operator would pay $30 million annually into the fund,

60. The tort liability situation is one in which the injured parties are strangers, not
customers of the firm. The ability of strict liability to both compensate victims and establish
incentives is discussed in SHAVELL, supra note 24, at 208-12.
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which is (1/1000) x ($50 billion - $20 billion). 61 Both the Clean Water
Act 62 and the Oil Pollution Act of 199063 ("OPA") include liability
provisions pertaining to oil spills. The OPA is the principal federal
statute pertaining to the damages caused by oil spills and is the focus
of the discussion here. Other federal statutes may also be pertinent
depending on the nature and consequences of the spill. 64 The OPA
imposes strict, joint and several liability for the damages caused by oil
spills.65 The damages components pertain to financial consequences as
well as natural resource damages. In particular, the pertinent
damages include removal costs and damages to natural resources, real
or personal property, subsistence use, revenues, profits and earning
capacity, and public services. 66 Thus, under § 2702(b)(2)(B) of the
United States Code, claimants can recover "injury to, or economic
losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property" if the
claimant "owns or leases that property."67 Section 2702(b)(2)(E)
addressed other financial losses by permitting "any claimant" to
recover "[dlamages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of
earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property,
personal property, or natural resources." 68 Section 2702(b)(2)(C)
addresses damages for the loss or destruction of natural resources. 69
The total amount of damages is subject to various caps
depending on the entity responsible for the spill, such as the type of
vessel or whether it was an offshore facility. 70 For oil spills resulting
from offshore facilities as in the BP situation, the applicable cap on all
61. These numbers are purely illustrative. Before an actual scheme is put into effect,
considerable work should be done estimating the distribution of potential losses for different
activities. Once that is done, a financial capacity floor can be established for each. A higher floor
makes compensation more secure and incentives more straightforward. Against those benefits,
there is the cost that it significantly limits the pool of firms that could undertake an activity,
thus reducing both competition and efficiency.
62. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (2006) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
63. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (2006) (codified as amended
in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
64. See National Marine Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 312, 16 U.S.C. § 1443 (2006) (containing
liability provisions pertaining to those involved in the operations of hazardous materials,
pollutants, or other materials that cause injury to sanctuary resources); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006) (same);
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 § 204, 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (2006) (same).
65. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
66. Id. § 2702(b).
67. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(B).
68. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(E).
69. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C).
70. Id. § 2704(a).
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damages paid is $75 million.71 This cap is set at such a paltry level
that damages paid will be meaningless for major spills such as the BP
Deepwater Horizon spill. However, these caps do not apply in
situations of gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of
applicable federal regulations pertaining to safety, construction, or
operation. 72 The existence of a massive oil spill could potentially lead
jurors to conclude that the company was guilty of gross negligence.
Such judgments may be appropriate or may be influenced by hindsight
bias, with jurors assuming that the company either knew or should
have known that the spill would have occurred given its current
73
practices.
A potentially important damages component pertains to the
costs of addressing natural resource damages and any penalties for
residual damages amounts. The OPA provides for three different
measures of natural resource damages:
The measure of natural resource damages under section 2702(b)(2)(A) of this title is(A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the
damaged natural resources;
(B) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration; plus
(C) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages.

74

The OPA also provides for some coverage of the losses from a
spill. If the responsible party is unable to pay for all the damages,
those who have been injured by the spill can apply for reimbursement
from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, 75 which provides for damages
payments of up to $1 billion per oil-spill incident. 76 The actual harm
77
from the BP spill dwarfed even that larger amount.
The current damages regime for oil spills consequently follows
the retrospective liability approach. The company causing the damage

71.
72.

Id. § 2704(a)(3).
Id. § 2704(c)(1).

73.

See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65

U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998) (explaining the hindsight bias in which people overstate the
predictability of past events); W. Kip Viscusi, Do Judges Do Better?, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIFS DECIDE 188 (2002) (explaining the results of an experiment
indicating that jury-eligible citizens are more prone to hindsight bias than judges).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1).
75. Id. § 2712(a)(4).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2) (2006).

77. See, e.g., Ben Lefebvre & Tennille Tracy, BP Spill Fund Has Paid $5 Billion to
Claimants,WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2011, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424053111903461304576526711719321414.html (discussing the extent of the monetary
damage caused by the BP oil spill).
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is responsible for both the financial harm and the environmental
damage. 78 Monetary payments to those who have suffered losses are
appropriate for financial harm, whereas the OPA favors restoration
and remediation to try to bring the resource back to its prespill
condition. The OPA caps damages at $75 million except in situations
where the company is found guilty of specified infractions, such as
regulatory violations and gross negligence. 79 However, in the case of
the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, BP voluntarily waived this cap but
denied gross negligence.8 0 This waiver was made under considerable
outside pressure. President Obama stated in his address to the nation
on the BP spill: "I will. . inform [the chairman of BP] that he is to set
aside whatever resources are required to compensate the workers and
business owners who have been harmed as a result of his company's
recklessness."81
It is noteworthy that BP waived the $75 million cap and agreed
to pay billions in damages even though there had been no legal
determination that the cap did not bind. However, the prospects for
retaining such a cap appeared dim given that President Obama had
concluded that the company was guilty of "recklessness."8 2 BP also
had at stake its corporate reputation and its ability to market its
products to U.S. consumers, which might have been affected had it not
paid for the harm it imposed. From BP's standpoint, overwhelming
political forces swamped traditional economic/legal considerations.
In theory, both strict liability and negligence standards can
produce efficient outcomes. We advocate strict liability with the
responsible party identified in advance for several reasons.
Determining whether a company is negligent requires a difficult
assessment of the ex ante benefits and costs of safety, but strict
liability has no such informational requirement. The inability to
externally monitor deepwater drilling involving multiple contractors
also complicates the task of apportioning blame and determining the
relative negligence of the different parties. Making the oil-drilling
operator responsible puts a large and knowledgeable firm with
78. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
79. Id. § 2704(a)(3).
80. Statement of BP Exploration & Production Inc. re Applicability of Limit of Liability
under Oil Pollution Act of 1990 at 1-2, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon' in the
Gulf of Mexico, on Apr. 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/OilSpill/Orders/BPStatement.pdf.
81. Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil
Spill (June 15, 2010), available at http:lwww whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentnation-bp-oil- spill.
82. Id.
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authority in charge of the safety decisions. The operator can, of course,
work out contractual arrangements with the various contractors to
shift some of the liability burden. While a negligence standard would
reduce the transaction costs of a flurry of lawsuits, major oil spills
3
from deepwater drilling are likely to be relatively infrequent events.8
The essence of our proposed arrangement is that we should have a
single equivalent of a residual claimant (from whom to collect
damages) and that this party should be large, knowledgeable, and
powerful enough to engage whichever other parties it wishes to carry
out its mission. This is the best way to place incentives in the hands of
the party that knows the most and that has the greatest ability to
control the outcome. Under our proposal, the responsible party in turn
can contract with the other companies involved in the drilling and can
specify the circumstances under which they will be liable and the
amount of this liability. Moreover, the responsible party also will have
an incentive to monitor the behavior of the other companies involved.
The report by the Coast Guard, which placed substantial blame on
Transocean Ltd., which operated the drilling rig, indicated that
84
multiple parties may have been at fault.
Because of the potential contribution to the accident of its
drilling contractors, BP filed several lawsuits in an effort to recoup
some of the damages it incurred.8 5 As one might expect based on the
Coast Guard report, BP sued Transocean.8 6 Moreover, BP filed a
83. A traditional contributory negligence approach often involves looking at the behavior of
the injured party. Thus, driver A may have been a bit reckless when he crashed into B as he was
passing, but B may have wandered into his lane, which would exonerate A. The equivalent in the
oil-spill case would be exonerating the operator, because the fisherman should not have set up
his operation in a zone close to a deepwater oil well. Such reasoning, if allowed to stand when
one party imposes catastrophic risks on many others, would impede a broad range of economic
activity. When you buy a house, it should not be your responsibility to assess whether the factory
nearby is a fire hazard.
84. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Companies, Crews, and Regulators Share Blame in Coast
Guard Report on Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at A9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/us/23spill.html (discussing the Coast Guard's report on the
DeepwaterHorizon oil spill); Russell Gold & Angel Gonzalez, Spill Report Faults TransoceanRig,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2011, at A3, availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748703387904576279110653117564.html (discussing Transocean Ltd.'s level of
fault in the Deepwater Horizon spill according to the Coast Guard report).
85. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley, BP Sues 3 Companies Over Alleged Roles in Deepwater
available at
http://www.eenews.
Apr.
21,
2011,
GREENWIRE,
Horizon Spill,
net/public/Greenwire/2011/0421/1 (explaining BP's decision to sue Transocean Ltd., Halliburton
Co., and Cameron International Corp.).
86. See, e.g., Aude Lagorce, BP Sues Halliburton, Transocean, Cameron, MARKET WATCH
(Apr. 21, 2011), http'J/www.marketwatch.com/story/bp-sues-halliburton-transocean-cameron2011-04-21-954390 (discussing BP's filing of lawsuits against Transocean Ltd., Halliburton Co.,
and Cameron International Corp.).
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lawsuit against Cameron International Corp., which manufactured
what BP termed a "dangerous" blowout preventer and, in BP's view,
was negligent.8 7 BP also sued Halliburton, alleging misconduct and
fraud.8 8 Under our proposal, BP would shoulder the liability but would
still be able to sue its partners unless the contracts with the partners
absolved them of all liability.
Determining the value of losses is far from a simple accounting
exercise. In the case of financial harms, the task is to determine who
has been harmed and to what extent. As in standard damages
assessments, the task in calculating the loss people have experienced
as a result of the spill is to determine the income (or property value)
trajectory people would have had if the spill had not occurred, the
income path they have experienced to date and are expected to have in
the future, and the difference between these. Calculating the
compensation appropriate for a given person is complicated by the
confounding effects of the prolonged recession that began in 2008.
Disentangling the effects of the spill from that of macroeconomic
conditions on, for example, hotel revenues would be difficult.
There is the related issue of who should be included in the set
of people meriting compensation. How broadly should the
compensation be structured? If a hotel has suffered a loss in revenues
due to the spill and receives compensation, should all the suppliers to
the hotel be compensated as well? Are there geographic boundaries to
such compensation? Should these suppliers receive compensation if
they are located in different parts of the country? More generally,
where should the line be drawn given the ripple effects of economic
activity? Our approach under policy proposal number five8 9 is to make
payment only for the direct effects, recognizing that such payments in
turn will generate additional economic activity as well. This approach
is the norm in personal injury cases as, for example, after a wrongful
death, there is a payment to the survivors for the earnings that the
person has lost, but there is no payment to all the stores where the
90
deceased would have spent money.

87. See Russell Gold & Angel Gonzalez, BP Sues Contractors Transocean, Cameron, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 21, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038380045762755106071
52074.html (discussing BP's negligence claims against Cameron).
88. See Guy Chazan, BP Sues Halliburton Over Gulf Disaster, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2011,
http://online.wsj.comarticle/SB10001424052748704071704576276421727774228.html
(discussing BP's claims against Halliburton based on allegations of misconduct that contributed
to the DeepwaterHorizon oil spill).
89. See infra Table 1.
90. See 22 AIn JUR. 2D Death § 3 (2011).
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A potentially challenging issue is how to treat losses not caused
by the spill itself but which were generated by misperceptions about
the spill.91 The spill garnered enormous media attention and was the
subject of an Oval Office address by President Obama, who said:
Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced. And
unlike an earthquake or a hurricane, it's not a single event that does damage in a
matter of minutes or days. The millions of gallons of oil that have spilled into the Gulf of
Mexico are more like an epidemic, one that we will be fighting for months and even
92
years.

Newspapers likewise ran stories suggesting major threats to
tourism due to the spill. 93 Coupled with repeated front-page coverage
of the spill and its threat to the Gulf beaches, it is not surprising that
there was a consumer reaction, including unwarranted responses to
inaccurate news coverage that implied that the beaches were far more
tarnished than they were. 94 The BP spill led to a substantial drop in
tourism at Gulf Coast beaches even for beaches that the spill did not
affect. 95 Given the media coverage dramatizing the historic nature of
the magnitude of the spill and the forecasts of catastrophic effects,
people might well have rationally chosen to act on their
misperceptions and alter their vacation plans even though their fears
proved to be unfounded. Losses due to loss of consumer confidence are
not compensable under current laws, but these are real losses that
could potentially be reduced by using credible risk-communication
efforts. 96 Given the financial self-interest of the companies responsible
for the spill, to be believed, such communication might best be
handled by governmental entities.
VI. WHO SHOULD PAY FOR THE DAMAGES?
As noted above, the current liability regime established by the
OPA provides for strict, joint and several liability. However, with a
damages cap of $75 million, except in situations such as gross

91. Compensation for misperceptions would not be covered based on the interpretation by
John C.P. Goldberg. John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the
Deepwater Horizon Spill 9 (Nov. 22, 2010), available at httpJ/dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle
/1/4595438/Report on Economic Loss Liability 11 22 10.pdf.
92. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 173.
93. Catharine Skipp, Florida Worries About Effect on Tourism, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2010,
at
A18,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/science/eartI20tourism.html
(discussing the Deepwater Horizon oil spill's negative effect on tourism in Florida).
94. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 191.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 278-79.
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negligence, the seemingly stringent liability regime is not nearly as
stringent as it might appear if implemented literally. 97 Moreover,
without a truly meaningful financial-resource requirement imposed on
firms that are permitted to undertake deepwater-drilling operations,
the actual cap on damages paid would be merely the net worth of the
firm plus its insurance, even if the firm is guilty of gross negligence. In
some instances, that could be even less than $75 million.
In assessing the appropriateness of the liability regime, the
first issue is whether the drilling firms should be subject to strict
liability rather than some other legal requirement such as a
negligence standard. With a strict liability standard, the oil firm is
responsible for all the harm associated with drilling, even if the firm
exercises an exemplary level of care. Under a negligence standard, the
firm would only be liable if its level of care fell below a reasonable
standard of care, such as one that strikes an efficient balance between
risk and cost.
A strict liability standard is preferable to a negligence standard
for deepwater-drilling operations for several reasons. First, a
negligence standard requires both a determination of the standard of
care used to judge negligence and a determination of whether the oil
firm met that standard. Either of these determinations would be a
challenging task. Oil-drilling operations are extremely complex and
require considerable specialized expertise-and, even with such
expertise, fully understanding the appropriate levels of care is
extremely difficult for external observers. Given the information gap
between what the company knows and what outside observers can
determine, a strict liability standard offers the advantage of
overcoming the informational asymmetry problem. With a strict
liability standard, only the oil firm need know what the efficient level
of care is and whether the firm has met it.
Second, there is a random element to all human behavior that
is difficult to predict, and accidents combine that randomness with the
uncertainties associated with technologies and nature. The oil
company may have adopted sound technologies and training programs
for its workers so that from an institutional standpoint its actions are
responsible, but nevertheless accidents, sometimes even catastrophic
accidents, do occur. As drilling operations proceed and unexpected
97. The OPA in effect treats oil spills in a manner similar to the treatment of hazardous
substance sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (2006); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 805-11 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (imposing strict, joint, and several liability under CERCLA
unless responsible parties can prove the harm is divisible).
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complications arise, there may be no existing guidelines for these
situations. The Commission's review of the BP spill identified
numerous such judgmental errors made under conditions of
substantial stress and unanticipated conditions, despite fierce
incentives for BP to get things right. 98 A strict liability standard
avoids the task of determining whether the company had been
negligent in the training, monitoring, and operations procedures.
In the case of the BP oil spill, three major firms were involved
in the operations: BP, Halliburton, and Transocean. 99 BP is the largest
owner of tracts in the Gulf, as it owns more than 1,500 tracts in areas
where the water is deeper than 1,500 feet and owns more than onethird of all the deepwater reserves. 10 0 It is also the fourth largest
petroleum company in the world, with revenues of $297 billion in
2010.101 Halliburton is an energy products company with substantial
10 2
oil-drilling activities, with revenues in 2010 of $18 billion.
Transocean is the largest contractor of offshore oil rigs in the world,
with revenues in 2009 of $11.6 billion. 10 3 The National Commission
identified significant errors made by each of these three companies,
where these errors contributed to the likelihood of the spill and the
extent of the harm. 0 4 With eight different principal causes of the
accident involving these three companies, sorting out the respective
10 5
responsibility for the accident would be an impossible task.

98. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 89-129.
99. See, e.g., Lagorce, supra note 86 (discussing BP's filing of lawsuits against Transocean
Ltd., Halliburton Co., and Cameron International Corp.).
100. BP COMM'N REPORT, supranote 1, at 47.
101. Id. at 2; BP, FINANCIAL AND OPERATING INFORMATION 2006-2010, at 7 (2011), available
at http://www.bp.com/liveassetsfbp-internet/globalbp/STAGING/global-assets/downloads/F/
FOI_2006_2010 full book.pdf.
Comparative
Highlights,
HALLIBURTON,
102. Financial
Reports:
(last visited May 16,
http://ir.halliburton.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=67605&p---irol-reportsOther
2010). For cementing operations alone, Halliburton had $1.7 billion in business in 2009. BP
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 224.
103. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
104. Id. at 115-22.
105. BP, DEEPWATER HORIZON ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT 4-6 (2010), available at

http://www.bp.com/liveassetsfbp-internet/globalbp-uk-englishincident-response/STAGING/local
see
also
_assets/downloads.pdfs/DeepwaterHorizonAccidentInvestigationReport.pdf;
DONALD C. WINTER, NAT'L ACAD. OF ENG'G & NATL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS.,
INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HoRIZON OIL RIG BLOWOUT AND WAYS TO

PREVENT SUCH EVENTS (2010), available at httpl/www.nationalacademies.org/includes/
DHInterimReportfifmal.pdf. Sometimes, even if the production function for the accident were
fully known, the task is logically impossible. Consider two extreme cases: (1) each firm alone
could have avoided the accident, and (2) given the actions by the other two firms, no firm alone
could have prevented the accident. For either case, apportioning blame would not be possible.
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Imposing a strict liability standard with the oil-drilling firm being
responsible for all losses eliminates the daunting task of calculating
the extent to which negligence by each of these companies contributed
to the damage.
The responsibility for a spill involving multiple parties can be
allocated in various ways. The approach under the OPA is to impose
joint and several liability. If the oil firm's resources are insufficient to
pay for the damages, the other firms involved in the operation are
liable for any excess. With a $75 million damages cap, the joint and
several aspect imposes little deterrent on a highly expensive project,
such as a deepwater well, except to avoid situations involving gross
negligence, in which case the cap would no longer apply.
An efficient economic solution is to make all firms involved
liable for the full costs of an oil spill so that each firm when making its
safety decisions would take into account the full value of the losses
that will occur should there be an accident. Such an approach is not
appropriate in practice because it will lead to total payments well in
excess of damages. Moreover, assuming full liability will discourage
subcontractors from being involved in the drilling operation.
Furthermore, participating firms, who together would be paying much
more than the actual costs should an accident occur, would have an
incentive to collude to produce excess safety. Such an excess would
inhibit beneficial economic activity.
Our proposal for determining how payment should be made for
an oil spill has four separate components. Our policy proposal number
five specifies that there should be no cap on damages payments. The
current $75 million cap, except in situations such as gross negligence,
makes the responsible firm liable for only a small portion of the
damage from any major spill. In order to generate the appropriate
incentives for care in a strict liability regime, the oil-drilling firm must
be responsible for all the harm that its actions generate.
Removal of the damages cap, or indeed any measure that leads
to an increase in expected damages paid after an accident, could lead
small firms with limited financial resources to engage in the activity.
They would be able to effectively cap their damages by being unable to
pay them. To avoid the problems associated with insolvency, we
propose a requirement that the oil company demonstrate financial
resources or adequate insurance sufficient to pay for most possible
harms before being allowed to drill (our policy proposal number four).
Current financial requirements, which are on the order of $35 million
to $150 million for different offshore facilities, are more than two
orders of magnitude below the kind of worst-case scenario that did in
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fact occur with the BP oil spill. 106 More typically, the amount is
10 7
between $10 million and $35 million depending on the facility,
where the President under current law can increase the amount up to
$150 million. 0 8 To ensure protection, the government should
dramatically strengthen the financial resource requirements.
Imposing such a resource requirement will prevent many small
businesses from being able to engage in deepwater drilling, which is a
development that is of concern to small-business advocates and has
led to political opposition to raising the cap. 10 9 However, in our view
there is no sound rationale for permitting firms to engage in activities
that threaten the risk of catastrophic harms that will not be
addressed. Moreover, if small firms are permitted to operate in such
an environment, with the ability to escape most of the ultimate costs
of their actions, these firms will have little economic incentive to
incorporate the costs of potential risky outcomes when making their
safety decisions. The result will be inadequate levels of care. 11 0
Our policy proposals one and two replace the current OPA joint
and several liability provision and place full liability on the oil
company that owns the lease. Thus, rather than requiring that all
companies involved in the drilling operation demonstrate adequate
financial resources (including contracted-for payment from others and
insurance) to cover potential damages, this requirement would only be
imposed on the well operator.
Given the structure of our proposal, imposing this liability will
also create substantial incentives for the company to monitor the
safety-related decisions of its drilling partners and to influence those
decisions through contractual arrangements should those partners
contribute to an accident. A consistent theme of the President's
Commission report is that assessment of the safety practices and
106. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 283. Economic losses for the spill are estimated at
tens of billions of dollars. Id. at vi.
107. 33 U.S.C. § 2716(c)(1)(B) (2006).
108. Id. § 2716(c)(1)(C) (upon determination by the president that the liability is greater
than the amount provided in § 2716(c)(1)(B), the party shall be liable "for an amount determined
by the President not exceeding $150,000,000').
109. There may, however, be possible insurance options that would enable smaller firms to
operate. See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 246 (discussing several insurance alternatives
to self-insurance against major accidents). However, note that the possibility of obtaining
insurance coverage may be reduced if all liability caps are removed.
110. An alternative would be to fully regulate their activities to assure an appropriate
standard of care. We argue throughout that information asymmetries make incentives rather
than regulation the preferred manner for dealing with offshore-drilling risks. Moreover, even
with appropriate standards of care, accidents will happen. With small operators, desirable
compensation would not be available.
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technologies requires highly specialized expertise that the government
currently does not have and is unlikely to ever develop because people
with that expertise are highly paid, well above levels in the
government pay range. As a fallback solution, the Commission
suggests various alternatives such as, in effect, borrowing the talent
by using an approach patterned after that employed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. But even if the government is successful in
devising a makeshift administrative solution to assembling the
requisite talent, that will only be available for reviews of continuing
safety practices and actual disasters. However, the myriad decisions
that the Commission identified as contributing to the BP oil spill for
the most part were well beyond standard operating procedures.
Responsibility for monitoring should be the primary task for the oil
company operating the well, the responsible party, which has both the
superior technical expertise and the on-the-field knowledge to better
promote safety than do government regulators.
Deepwater-drilling operations are complex and, by necessity,
may involve multiple companies bringing their distinctive expertise.
Under our proposed damages regime, which makes the oil company
fully responsible for the damages, there would be a disincentive to
partner with others if the responsible company did not expect others'
safety decisions to reflect appropriate care. Even in the case of the BP
oil spill, BP operated the well and was best situated to monitor safetyrelated actions as well as the activities of its two main contractors,
Halliburton and Transocean. 111 Our policy proposal number one
addresses this issue. The oil company is the responsible party in the
first place. However, it can establish a liability structure of its own,
defining the circumstances under which its drilling partners would be
responsible for damages and the level of these damages payments
should a spill occur, depending on how the parties performed, and so
forth. Thus, the oil firm and the drilling partners can agree to
contractual arrangements that ensure that the oil firm will receive
appropriate compensation for any financial harms attributable to its
drilling partners. It will be the responsibility of the oil company to
ascertain whether its collaborators have adequate financial resources
and/or insurance, since the failure of these companies to reimburse
the oil company for damages will not reduce the oil company's
liability.

111. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 223.
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VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Our proposed liability regime eliminates any productive role
for punitive damages. Thus, under our proposal number five, which
can be found in Table 1, firms should bear no punitive damages.
Unlike the current liability structure, which caps damages at $75
million except under circumstances that closely follow criteria for
punitive damages (such as "gross negligence"), 1 2 our proposal number
five removes any damages cap. The responsible firm is liable for all
damages that are incurred. This structure establishes incentives both
sufficient and efficient from the standpoint of deterrence as well as
appropriate levels of insurance. Eliminating the possibility of punitive
damages has precedent; the Price-Anderson Act has done precisely
3
this for nuclear power."
Consider first the adequacy of deterrence if punitive damages
are eliminated. In situations where damages amounts are set equal to
the level of the harm, such amounts will establish efficient levels of
deterrence except when the probability of detection is below 1.0.114
However, catastrophic oil spills are paradigmatic cases of highly
visible harms. Unlike midnight dumping of hazardous wastes, where
the likelihood that a perpetrator will escape detection makes punitive
damages desirable as a way to multiply damages, a catastrophic spill
is sure to be noticed and its origin identified.
Punitive damages likewise have no constructive role from the
standpoint of compensation. The insurable losses associated with
financial harms are included in the required compensatory damages
payments for which the oil firm is liable. The firm is required to
undertake all appropriate remediation efforts for environmental
harms because money is not a suitable substitute. For any shortfalls of
or delays in the remediation, the firm is liable for the remaining

112. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1)(3) (2006).
113. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(s) (2006). Although the Price-Anderson Act does
not establish liability equivalent to our proposal, it does require private insurance by the owner
of $375 million coupled with contributions to a separate fund so that total recoverable damages
are $11.975 billion. U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, FACT SHEET NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND
DISASTER RELIEF FUNDS 1 (2011), availableat httpJ/www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/factsheetsfunds-fs.pdf.
114. This result, which dates back to the work of Jeremy Bentham, is presented in A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 887-96 (1998). For efficient deterrence, when the probability of detection falls below 1,
the damages paid should be $D/p, where $D is the level of damages and p is the probability of
detection. Id.
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natural resource damages. Because there are no gaps in the damages
payment structure, there is no need for punitive damages.
Missing from this discussion is the possible role of punitive
damages from the standpoint of punishment, above and beyond its
deterrent or compensatory role. Given the much more stringent
liability system that we have proposed, firms will already be punished
much more than they presently are under the current liability system,
since they will not enjoy any damages cap and will be required to have
the financial resources to pay very large damages claims.
Our proposal eliminates the severe risk of the misapplication of
punitive damages as a form of punishment for catastrophic
environmental harms. To the extent that jurors evaluate behavior by
the level of the incurred harm rather than by whether firms have
struck an efficient balance between risk and cost, there will be a
tendency to award punitive damages for major oil spills irrespective of
whether the company has struck that balance appropriately.11 5 Our
proposal eliminates the risk of erroneous jury judgments, establishes a
liability structure that provides strong incentives for prudence while
also securing damages payments for most accidents, and raises a tax
fund that could be used for payments in case of catastrophic losses.
VIII. PROSPECTIVE LIABILITY AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Recognizing that not all companies have sufficiently deep
pockets, one might instead adopt the prospective liability approach in
which companies pay in advance for the expected losses that their
activities might inflict. Indeed, the tax on the noncompensable risk
component of our proposal adopts this framework. The building blocks
for this analysis are different and much more demanding than those of
retrospective liability. Instead of knowing the magnitude of the harm
that has actually occurred, for the prospective liability approach to be
workable, one must be able to ascertain the distribution of possible
harms that might occur and the probabilities associated with their
different levels of damages. In particular, for unpredicted risks with a
fat-tailed distribution, precise judgments of this type are difficult to
make. 116 The informational requirements of a prospective liability

115. See W. Kip Viscusi, CorporateRisk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547, 563
(2000) ("Instead of comparing expected benefits and costs, jurors may compare the enormous cost
to the victim with the relatively negligible cost of the safety improvement.").
116. See Daniel A Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 926-27 (2011) ("The reason that
the probabilities are difficult to estimate is that data will rarely include instances from the tail
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regime, and the potential for error, exceed the informational
requirements associated with retrospective liability, which is why we
use retrospective liability of the responsible party as our core incentive
mechanism.
The main advantage of prospective liability is that by scaling
down the payments to the expected losses rather than the actual
losses inflicted, paying the costs will become feasible for a broader
population of firms. More companies will pay for the expected
prospective damages, including those that do not experience any
adverse events, thus creating incentives to foster safe drilling
operations. The main ingredient that is missing when compared to the
usual retrospective liability solution is that the prospective penalties
are not linked to any payment by the responsible firm to those who
have suffered the harm.
Although the prospective liability approach need not entail
such compensation, it could do so by placing the expected liability cost
payments in a compensation fund not unlike the current Oil Liability
Trust Fund. In the long run, if charges were appropriately tallied,
such a fund should be able to address the losses incurred provided
that the risks and losses are assessed accurately and a major disaster
does not occur before adequate resources have been accumulated in
such a fund. Moreover, unlike the retrospective liability situation,
damages would not be limited by the risk of insolvency. 117 Our
proposed two-tier liability system would rely on payments by the
responsible firm to cover damages, with the money raised by the tax
only used for compensation for damages exceeding the firm's financial
resources.
Under our proposal, despite its strong focus on liability and
incentives, government regulations will still have a continuing, albeit
altered, role. Indeed, regulation will be expanded in the area of
ascertaining whether all companies engaged in deepwater drilling
have adequate financial resources to be engaged in such dangerous
activities. However, in recognition of the inability of regulators to
determine and monitor efficient levels of safety, we rely on incentives
created by liability to achieve that goal. Thus, the principal regulatory
task is not with respect to assessing safety practices and technologies

(because the events are rare), making it impossible to estimate just how quickly the tail tapers

off.').
117. Many such schemes, such as the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation, tend to collect
far below the actuarial value of the costs imposed. Such deficits occur because we do not properly
recognize fat tails, which add substantially to expected losses.
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but rather determining the financial capability of the firm operating
the well.
Government regulators also will continue to have responsibility
for establishing broad safety standards, as under the current
regulatory regime. Note that to separate the regulatory oversight,
management, and revenue functions, the Department of the Interior
had to alter its organizational structure after the spill. The Minerals
Management Service was reorganized into three separate entities
with distinct missions: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, and Enforcement; the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement; and the Office of Natural Resources
Revenue.1 18 Consistent with the conclusions of the Commission, these
activities could be bolstered based on what has been learned about
institutional shortcomings from the BP oil spill. However, unlike the
Commission, we are much less sanguine about the ultimate ability of
government regulators to fully address the safety concerns involved in
offshore drilling or to address a range of other advanced technology
tasks that have the potential to impose major risks. Government
regulators failed at the oversight task for the BP spill, and there is no
reason to believe that they will have the capability to control safetyrelated decisions adequately, which is why we have established a
liability structure that makes the oil company responsible for ensuring
well safety. Moreover, while the regulators can levy civil and criminal
penalties for various infractions, these penalties create only modest
financial incentives. The U.S. Department of the Interior levied only
$919,000 in penalties in 2009 and $2,073,000 in 2010.119
An inherent drawback of government regulation is that
government salaries for professionally qualified personnel, such as
engineers, are unlikely to attract workers with the requisite skill

118. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUAUTY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT
SERVICE'S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS
THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1-2

(2010) [hereinafter CEQ REPORT], available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/current-developments/docs/
CEQReport ReviewingIMSOCSNEPAImplementation.pdf; see also Press Release, U.S.
Department of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS's Three Conflicting Missions (May 19, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-ConflictingMIssions.cfm; Secretary of the Interior, Establishment of the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, and the Office of Natural
Resources Revenue, No. 3299 (May 19, 2010), http://elips.doi.gov/app-so/act~getfiles.cfm?order
_number=3299A1 (ordering the establishment of three new agencies).
119. For a list of penalties paid, see OCS Civil/Criminal Penalties, BUREAU OF OCEAN
ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, http://www.boemre.gov/civilpenalties/
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
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levels to undertake the required tasks effectively. 120 Government
regulators previously responsible for oversight fell short in terms of
their technical expertise. 12' This deficiency is unlikely to be remedied
in the future, as pay rates for those working on the rigs, including
22
those in management positions, run well into the six figures.
Raising salaries can boost personnel quality modestly, but the federal
pay scale at the top is far from sufficient to attract the kinds of
workers necessary to improve oversight of deepwater wells. 123 The
talent deficiency is sufficient to ensure that primary responsibility for
securing safety should not be through regulatory controls. Moreover,
even if there were government expertise, there is a profound
informational asymmetry in favor of the operator, who has far greater
knowledge of its technologies, operations, and procedures. For these
reasons, our proposals shift the preponderance of the responsibility for
safety to the oil-drilling company.
Why is deepwater drilling a special case in which government
regulation is inadequate given that the government is able to regulate
other activities, such as those generating air pollution and water
pollution, that impinge on the environment? Deepwater drilling is
hardly the only such technologically sophisticated industrial activity.
However, most other environmental regulatory tasks differ in
important aspects. Monitoring emissions and wastewater discharges
can be done on a continuing basis, where any particular emission or
discharge has only a minor relative impact. Government regulators
likewise are able to monitor whether an oil-spill disaster has occurred,
but the stakes are quite different, and the opportunity for learning is
much less, when dealing with a one-time-only situation of catastrophic
environmental harm.
Generally, government regulators can obtain and utilize
information regarding safety-related behavior in order to target its
regulatory energies reasonably effectively. One approach is to monitor
minor mishaps, smaller spills, and accidents that suggest a lax
corporate culture and to use such performance records in choosing
which facilities warrant greater scrutiny. In this context, BP had a
troubled record of safety violations, including an oil-refinery explosion
120. See JOHN DONAHUE, THE WARPING OF GOVERNMENT WORK 89-91 (2008) ("These
[salary] disparities make it hard for government to get, or to keep, the very best people ....
121. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 57.
122. Id. at 3.
123. See id. at 79, 258 (stating that the federal pay scale is too low to attract workers
qualified to oversee the drilling and recommending use of the salary scale used by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission).
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that killed fifteen workers in Texas, a major spill in Alaska due to a
corroded pipeline, and a lengthy history of safety management
problems. 124 That BP also had a major oil spill is not a one-time
adverse event that tarnishes an otherwise exemplary safety record.

IX. PROCEDURES FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES PAYMENTS
An administrative compensation scheme has and will conduct
much of the payment of financial compensation after the BP oil spill.
After negotiations with President Obama, BP established a $20 billion
fund for damages. 125 As of May 12, 2011, the fund had paid out $4.51
billion to individuals and businesses and $1.27 billion to government
entities. 12 6 The Gulf Coast Claims Facility handles payments to
individuals and businesses, 127 while governmental claims are handled
separately. 128 This fund approach provided payments to those who
suffered financial loss faster than if people had to file individual
129
lawsuits, though many claims are still being processed.
The operation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, which is
administered by Kenneth Feinberg, has been as follows: Participation
in the program is voluntary, as people could choose to file a damages
claim without availing themselves of the administrative compensation
structure. The criterion for receiving payment involves demonstrating
a financial loss from the BP spill.130 The particular categories of
covered loss parallel those under the OPA and include claims for
"removal and clean up costs, damage to real or personal property, lost
earnings or profits, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, or
physical injury or death."'13 1 The fund does not cover nonfinancial
124. Id. at 2, 221.
125. Id. at 185.
126. BP, CLAIMS AND GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS: GULF OF MEXICO OIL SPILL, PUBLIC
REPORT-5/12/2011 (2011), availableat http://responsedata.bp.com/files/PublicClaimsStatus
Tracking0512201 1.pdf.
127. Claims by individuals and businesses can be filed at http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility
.com/index.
128. Government claims are filed at http://www.bp.com/governmentclaim.
129. See BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 185 ("In its first eight weeks of operation, as of
November 23, [2010,] the independently administered Gulf Coast Claims Facility had paid out
more than $2 billion to approximately 127,000 claimants.").
130. Id. at 287 ("Eligible claims include: (1) removal and clean-up costs; (2) physical damages
to real or personal property, (3) lost profits or impairment of earning capacity; (4) loss of
subsistence use of natural resources; and (5) physical injury or death.").
131. Frequently Asked Questions § 7, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.
gulfcoastclaimsfacility.comlfaq (last visited May 16, 2010). Compensation for injury and death is
not included under the OPA. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2006).
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harms, such as mental anguish and stress resulting from the spill.132
In addition, the fund reimbursed governmental costs such as the costs
incurred by Louisiana and Florida for seafood testing. 133 For any
compensation system, there will always be questions about whether
the calculations of the losses were accurate and whether the
compensation addressed all pertinent losses and only pertinent losses.
Overall, this compensation fund approach performed reasonably well
in terms of providing appropriate compensation according to the
insurance principles advocated above.
X. NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES
The BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is the largest offshore oil
spill in U.S. history, and one of the largest oil spills ever recorded.
Costs associated with stopping the spill, cleanup of the damages it
caused, financial losses imposed on businesses and workers,
remediation of natural resource damages, and compensation for
natural resource damages are among the prominent loss components.
The degree to which the responsible parties should clean up the spill
and undertake remediation efforts should depend on the benefits
derived from those efforts and the costs of doing them. Under our
proposal number six, which is located in Table 1, the emphasis should
be on remediation. However, remediation should only be carried out
where and to the extent that benefits exceed the costs. A natural
resource damages assessment can be used to assess these benefits and
to determine the value of lost resources that are not remediated.
Damaged natural resources have multiple dimensions. The
identified wildlife that were harmed include "8,183 birds, 1,144 sea
turtles, and 109 marine mammals affected by the spill-alive or dead,
visibly oiled or not."'134 There is also potential harm to fish due to
oiling of seaweed, which imposes risks on mahi mahi, billfish, and
cobia. 135 Other fish potentially harmed include the bluefin tuna, the
Gulf sturgeon, and several species of shark. 13 6 Offshore birds, such as
royal terns and gulls, and open-water, near-shore and marsh birds

132. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 131, § 10 ("An injury that relates to
emotional or mental health.. . is not an eligible claim.").
133. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 188.
134. Id. at 181.
135. RAY MABUS, SEC. OF THE NAVY, AMERICA'S GULF COAST: A LONG TERM RECOVERY PLAN
AFTER THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 28-29 (2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf
.gov/sites/default/filesdocumentspdf/gulf-recovery-sep-2010.pdf.
136. Id.
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137
might have been affected if their feeding grounds became oiled.
Some oil reached 650 miles of Gulf coastal habitats, with 130 miles
categorized as moderately or heavily oiled. 138 The oil also poses longer139
term risks to marine habitats, wetlands, corals, and other habitats.
Any damage to beaches, marshes, and the ecology of the Gulf and
affected marshes would also be included under the natural resource
damages heading, as would any effects on recreational activities such
as fishing and swimming.
The debate over putting a price tag on natural resource
damages that are not remediated achieved prominence after the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill ("EVOS"), which was the largest U.S. coastal oil
spill to that time. The plaintiffs in the EVOS litigation prepared
assessments of the natural resource damages loss to citizens based on
surveys of the public's valuation of damages. 140 These surveys were
subjected to a variety of strident critiques in the academic literature,
many of which were based on studies funded by Exxon. As a result of
this controversy over methodology, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration commissioned an expert panel to develop
guidelines for the use of surveys to value natural resource damages. 141
There are three natural resource damages components
pertaining to the environmental loss that the citizenry has
experienced. The first damages category pertains to the cost the party
responsible for the oil spill must incur. Restoration efforts may involve
cleaning up beaches and other efforts to restore the environment to
the prespill condition. The company responsible for the spill will incur
many of the costs directly, as demonstrated by Exxon's efforts to clean
up the Prince William Sound area after the EVOS. 142 Estimates of the
restoration costs associated with the BP oil spill are in the range of
$15 billion to $20 billion. 143 The third component of damages consists
137. See Affected Gulf Resources: NOAA Gulf Spill Restoration, NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, httpJ/www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/oilspill/affected-gulf-resources/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (noting that the presence of discharged
oil in the environment may cause decreased "habitat" and that such "birds depend on healthy
habitats to provide food, shelter, and breeding grounds').
138. BP COMMN REPORT, supra note 1, at 175-77.
139. See MABUS, supra note 135, at 28-29 (noting that the "long-term effects of oil on these
habitats have yet to be determined').
140. Richard T. Carson, et al., Contingent Valuationand Lost Passive Use: Damages from the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 25 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 257, 259-60 (2003).
141. Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Natural Resource Damage Assessments
Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601 (Jan. 15, 1993).
142. Questions and Answers, EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL TRUSTEE COUNCIL, httpJ/www.
evostc.state.ak.us/factsqanda.cfm (last visited Sept. 3, 2011).
143. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 279.
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of the cost of damages assessment, which one would expect to be a
minor component relative to other damages associated with oil spills
of the magnitude of the BP spill.
Economists' studies of natural resource damages assessments
have focused on the second natural resources damages component,
which pertains to the losses that occur from the time of the oil spill
until the natural resources have been fully restored. A variety of
natural actions can ameliorate natural resource damages, as Gulfbased, methane-eating bacteria did with the BP spill. 144 Beyond
natural recovery, there could be removal of oil at the sites, restoration
of natural resources, and either off-site replacement of the resource or
provision of equivalent natural resources that substitute for the
loss.145

Should the environment not be fully restored, or if there is a
temporary natural resource damages loss before full restoration, then
there is a natural resource damages component meriting
compensation. We propose that the government should receive such
compensation for two reasons. First, as indicated above in the
discussion of optimal insurance, environmental losses are not the
kinds of harms for which people would purchase insurance and for
which monetary payments can substitute. Second, because the nation
owns the resources on the outer continental shelf, payments made to
the government will correspond with compensating the resource
146
owner.
Let us consider the value of damages after the level of cleanup
and restoration has been determined and completed. What is the
value of the damages that remain? How should we conceptualize
losses? The reference point for determining the baseline situation from
which all damages are assessed is analogous to the approach used in
other damages contexts, which is to inquire what the situation would
have been "but for" the wrongful conduct. Thus, the analysis starts by
computing the trajectory over time of the value that the natural
resources would have had absent the spill. It then computes the drop
in the value of the natural resource from the time of the spill until full
restoration of the loss occurs, which may never happen. The loss at
any point of time is the decrease in the value of the natural resources,
144. John D. Kessler et al., A PersistentOxygen Anomaly Reveals the Fateof Spilled Methane
in the Deep Gulf of Mexico, 331 SCIENCE 312, 312 (2011).
145. For a description of these, see Carol Adaire Jones, Compensation for NaturalResource
Damages from Oil Spills: A Comparison of US Law and International Conventions, 11 INTL J.
ENV'T & POLLUTION 86 (1999).
146. BP COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 57.
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and the total loss consists of the total value of these per-period losses
from the time of the spill forward. Such assessments may be
complicated by unrelated ongoing environmental deterioration as, for
example, Louisiana has lost two-thousand square miles of wetlands
147
since the 1930s.
As is standard in economic damages contexts, once losses that
occur at different points in time have been determined, the value of
those losses must be discounted to, or brought back to, present value
using a reasonable rate of interest. 48 Because of the role of
discounting, even losses that may never be fully restored will
nevertheless have a finite value provided that the losses49 are not
increasing over time at a rate exceeding the rate of discount.
Conceptualizing the damages in terms of trajectories highlights
the dynamic nature of the damages assessment. What is at issue is
not simply the initial loss in natural resources, but also how fast the
natural resources will recover and to what extent. Thus, the valuation
process must, by necessity, take reductions in loss over time into
account. If, for example, some birds die, these losses are real even if
ultimately the population will recover fully. However, the speed of
recovery and the ultimate well-being of the bird population are also
consequential, further complicating the assessment of the
environmental damage. Sometimes, of course, losses compound over
time, and equivalent procedures looking at future consequences are
required.
The different benefit components can be categorized in terms of
the services associated with them where the breakdowns may involve
a mix of components, some that have market price analogs and others
that do not.1 50 Commercial/productive services pertain largely to
financial components associated with natural resource damages, such
as effects on agricultural irrigation, municipal drinking water, and
commercial fishing. In most instances, such losses will have either a
147. MABUS, supra note 135, at 26.
148. Thus, if the interest rate is r, then the present value of $1 in losses one year from now is
1/(l+r). Losses from the past should receive compound interest from the time of loss. Although
the appropriate rate of discount and interest remains a matter of economic debate, the U.S.
Office of Management and Budget's guidelines for U.S. regulatory policies specify the use of
discount rates of 3% and 7%. The 3% rate is much closer to current rates of return on U.S.
Treasury bills and bonds.
149. Thus, if losses were growing at a rate g > r, then the present value of losses next year
would be (l+g)/(l+r), which would be greater than 1. Should such a pattern continue with losses
growing indefinitely faster than the rate of interest, losses would be infinite.
150. For a detailed discussion of the OPA process for resource compensation, see Jones,
supra note 145, at 96.
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market price or information on the impact on corporate profitability.
Consequently, they can be linked directly to some kind of marketbased effect. Such market-related benefit components are not the
focus of our analysis as they should be relatively less problematic than
calculating losses for which no market guidance is available.
Other services categories often involve nonmarket effects that
make benefit assessment more difficult. Recreational and aesthetic
damages pertain to using beaches, swimming, and fishing, and include
activities, such as bird watching. Ecological consequences include
nutrient cycling and the well-being of fish apart from their commercial
or recreational value. There may also be cultural or historical uses of
resources. Finally, there is a category known as passive use, which is
sometimes referred to as nonuse. Even if people do not directly use the
resource, they may nevertheless value it, perhaps because of a concern
with scarce species or with the maintenance of the natural resource
for future generations. Closely related to passive use is the concept of
option values: people may not currently use the resource or have any
concrete plans to do so, but nevertheless they may value retaining the
151
resource to keep open the possibility of using it at some future date.
The natural resources damages value that is lost to the
citizenry is the monetary compensation needed to restore its members'
welfare to their prespill level. 152 This principle is in line with the
"make whole" approach to compensation for injury. The practical
problem is establishing this value.
In economic terms, we can view the value of required
compensation as a willingness-to-accept ('WTA') amount. Thus, WTA
measures how much money is required to compensate an individual
for the value of a loss if the objective is to restore that person's welfare
to what it would have been in the absence of the harm. A closely
related concept is willingness to pay ("WTP"), the amount that a
person would be willing to pay to prevent the harm from occurring.
The legal framing of compensation is in terms of the WTA amount.
For minor effects on one's welfare, the WTP amount should equal the
WTA amount. 153
Notwithstanding their theoretical similarity and approximate
equivalence, there are important gaps observed in practice between
151. Option value is what an economist would label discounted expected consumer surplus.
152. The monetary compensation principle for natural resource damages is articulated in 43
C.F.R. § 11.83 (2010) and Ohio v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
153. In particular, the discrepancy arises due to income effects, as willingness-to-pay values
involves a depletion of one's financial resources and willingness-to-accept amounts augment
one's resources through compensation.
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the values for WTA and WTP. In particular, WTA values often dwarf
the values for WTP by much more than economic theory would have
reasonably predicted. 154 Based on a review of the literature including
both survey and experimental studies, the average discrepancy across
studies between the mean WTA value and the mean WTP value is a
ratio of 7.17.155 However, the gap is much greater for public or
nonmarket goods such as those involving environmental damages, as
the mean ratio of WTA to WTP is 10.41 for such goods. 156 Unfamiliar
goods that are not ordinary private goods that the person might
purchase tend to generate high ratios. 15 7 Thus, even though WTA and
WTP should be similar, they often differ by an order of magnitude for
the types of commodities involved in natural resource damages cases.
This enormous discrepancy, though at odds with conventional
economic theory, is consistent with a phenomenon well known in the
behavioral decision literature as the endowment effect. 158 In
particular, there is a surprising asymmetry between the WTA and
WTP values that arises once people possess a good, even for easily
replaced goods such as coffee mugs and pens that have been the
objects of experimental studies. Such effects indicate the important
role of reference points in affecting decisions. 159 Framing choices in
terms of a loss from one's status quo position generates quite different
and often implausibly large valuations when compared to valuing
improvements from the current starting point.
XI. CONCLUSION

The BP oil spill highlighted fundamental safety problems with
deepwater drilling that led to a catastrophic accident. 160 Alas, we
should not think of this accident as an aberrant occurrence, but rather
as an outcome that must be expected on occasion given the incentives
154. For a review, see John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Review of WTA/WTP
Studies, 44 J. ENVTh ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002).
155. Id. at 432 tbl.ll.A.
156. Id. at 433 tbl.II.A
157. Id. at 442.

158. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL ECON. 1325 (1990).
159. Alistair Munro & Robert Sugden, On the Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 50
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 407 (2003).
160. The chief executive of BP, Robert Dudley, observed, "I think it would be a mistake to
dismiss our experience of the last year simply as a 'black swan,' a one -in-a-million occurrence
that carries no wider application for our industry as a whole." Clifford Krauss, BP Chief Says
Industry Must Change to Guard Against Spills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, at B9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/business/energy-environment/09bp.html.
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operating with the current regulatory and liability regime. Examining
those incentives, and creating a superior regime for the future, is the
principal goal of this Article.
The task is critical. To be sure, in response to the spill, one
would expect companies to become more diligent and government
regulators to become more vigilant. However, with 3,754 deepwater
wells already drilled and more pending, there will be a substantial
161
number of additional opportunities for environmental disasters.
Although the BP spill was the largest U.S. spill in offshore waters,
from 1996 to 2009 there were seventy-nine other reported loss-of-well62
control accidents involving uncontrolled hydrocarbon flows.1
In our view, the policy changes undertaken to date are far from
sufficient. The BP spill sends a clear message that our current liability
structure is woefully inadequate. Had the spill not involved a major
international oil company with exceptionally deep pockets and had the
environmental harm not been much less than could have occurred, the
BP oil spill catastrophe would have been much more devastating.
Our package of policy reforms summarized in Table 1 imposes
strict liability on the oil-drilling company in addition to requiring
proof of substantial financial resources to address potential harms.
Under our scheme, operators must be of a sufficient scale, or otherwise
purchase insurance or post bonds, to ensure that they could cover
losses in almost all situations in which there is a spill. We pointed out,
however, that losses from a spill have a fat-tailed distribution and
that even with our reform proposal there is a small chance of a spill
imposing costs well beyond such amounts. If the expected costs
associated with such "excess losses" were minor relative to overall
expected costs, this would not be a concern. However, given the fattailed nature of the losses, they may in fact comprise a significant
portion. In other words, the very small percentage of extremely large
spills may account for a meaningful proportion of overall expected
costs. For example, the BP spill is an outlier in the upper tail of the
distribution of losses from drilling operations in the United States
over the course of the nation's history.

161. This count is for wells drilled at depths of more than 1,000 feet. See CEQ REPORT, supra
note 118, at 14 n.36 (summarizing the history of drilling oil and gas wells in the Gulf of Mexico);
see also Offshore Statistics by Water Depth, BUREAUOF OCEAN ENERGY, MGMT. & ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/fastfacts/WaterDepth/
WaterDepth.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2011) (providing statistics on offshore-drilling activity
updated on a weekly basis).
162. These flows include both underground and at-the-surface flows. See BP COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 1, at 226.
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The inefficiencies associated with excess spills-those above
the firm's ability to pay for the damage-are twofold. First, losses that
should be compensated will not be compensated. Second, incentives for
safety will be insufficient because operators will recognize that they
are not responsible for a significant portion of the expected costs they
are imposing. Although not perfect, a second-best solution is to
augment the substantial financial requirements with charges for the
expected externality costs that cannot be covered with the company's
resources.
Our package of policy reforms will rectify the major
shortcomings of current arrangements by ensuring that firms
undertaking activities with catastrophic risks can pay for the damage
should there be an accident and will in fact be responsible for the full
economic value of the costs their activities generate. This structure in
turn will create incentives for companies to achieve an efficient level
of safety. We rely on the role of a more meaningful retrospective
liability approach rather than regulation alone, given the
informational asymmetries and the specialized expertise that is
required to effectively monitor the safety of deepwater drilling.
Although the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill inspired its
creation, our proposal can be applied generally to catastrophic
environmental risks. Other contexts share the basic ingredients that
led to our proposal for deepwater drilling. The incurred environmental
risks may generate losses far in excess of the responsible party's
ability to pay. Fat-tailed risks of catastrophic losses demand a quite
different liability structure from the one that is appropriate for
events, such as product
modest-loss
frequently occurring,
manufacturing defects. One possibility would be to bolster the role of
regulation, but the combination of informational asymmetries and
lack of specialized technical expertise within government make this an
ineffective remedy. Our two-tier liability proposal specifically
recognizes the nature of catastrophic risks and will greatly bolster the
incentives for safety.
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FIGURE 1: FAT TAILS FOR CATASTROPHIC EVENTS
ens?
Feualtl Me

Source: U.S. Geological Service Fact Sheet, "Natural Disasters - Forecasting Economic and Life
Losses," http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/natural-disasters/index-html.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF PROPOSAL TO CURRENT LIABILITY
REGIME
Component

Viscusi-Zeckhauser Proposal

Current Policy

1. Responsible
party

Single responsible party. Contracts
with other participants to receive
compensation in case of an accident.

Joint and several
liability.

2. Strict liability

Yes.

Yes.

3. Tax on
noncompensable
risk

Yes as part of tiered liability system.

No tax based on
financial capacity but
contributions to Oil
Spill Liability Trust
Fund.

4. Financial
capacity

Resources plus contracted
compensation plus insurance
sufficient to meet BP spill magnitude
for deep water drilling, with capacity
amount set generally based on
potential damages in risk context.

$35 million-$150
million.

5. Damages

No damages cap, no punitive
damages, compensate only direct
losses,

$75 million damages
cap with exceptions,
punitive damages
possible, only direct
losses compensable.

6. Natural
resource
damages

Priority for restoration coupled with
benefit-cost test.

Priority for restoration.

7. Recipient of net
resource value
losses

Government.

Government.

8. Regulation

Complement, recognizing limitation.

Prominent relative role.

9. Benefit
components

Focused, net benefits, including
environmental harms.

Credits for energy
independence and
employment effects.

10. Moratorium
until
implemented

Yes.

No.

